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BRINGING DOWN THE AVERAGE: THE
CASE FOR A "LESS SOPHISTICATED"
REASONABLENESS STANDARD IN US
AND EU CONSUMER LAW
Jason Cohen*
"So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter
of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well-informed." Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)
"The presumption is that consumers will inform themselves
about the quality and price of products and will make intelligent
choices." Opinion of Mr. Advocate GeneralFennelly, Este Lauder
Cosmetics GmbH & Co. OHG v. LancasterGroup GmbH, Case C220/98 (1999)
"The law is not made for experts but to protect the public,
that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking,
and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze
but too often are governed by appearancesand general impression."
Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942)
"Think of how stupid the average person is, and then realize
half of them are stupider than that." George Carlin

European Master in Law and Economics, 2018.
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INTRODUCTION
It is well understood that individuals do not generally
behave like the perfectly rational actors of neoclassical economics.
Rather, we are flawed, impulsive, and often easily swayed; our
choices are not always well thought out or internally consistent.
We tend to underestimate future risks and costs and to
miscalculate the likelihood of uncertain outcomes. We can be
prone to poor judgment and systematic errors in our perception,
information processing, and decision-making. As retail consumers,
we are frequently pressed for time or inattentive; as financial
consumers, we can be confused by complexity and limited in
computational ability. We are not as sophisticated in our approach
to everyday consumer decisions as the firms that spend significant
time and money studying consumer psychology to understand how
best to sell their products.
To most judges, however, the average consumer bears more
resemblance to a perfectly rational actor than to 'the picture of
decidedly imperfect rationality described above. In assessing the
fairness of commercial practices, the prevailing judicial standards
in the United States ("US") and the European Union ("EU") are
grounded in a fundamentally inaccurate model of human behavior
that has disproportionately detrimental effects on the poor, the
indebted, the minorities, the women, and the elderly, particularly
in the consumer finance and credit context.
This paper examines the "reasonable consumer" standards
currently employed in these jurisdictions and describes how a
judicial failure to account for the cognitive biases and limitations
of consumers allows firms to engage in exploitative strategic
behavior, perpetuating existing imbalances and reducing overall
social welfare. Part H of the paper contrasts the standard rational
choice model and its focus on remedying information asymmetry
with the realities of consumer behavior, including consumers'
overall lack of financial literacy and the widening sophistication
gap between consumers and their commercial counterparties. Part
III discusses how judges have discretion to incorporate behavioral
concepts into these standards but generally decline to do so. This
Part also explains why it matters whether the judicial perception
of typical consumer behavior aligns with reality. Parts IV and V,
respectively, survey the existing consumer protection landscape in
the US and EU. Part VI proposes a new approach to the judicial
perception of the average consumer. Part VII concludes.
Specifically, the paper argues that judges should interpret
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the reasonable or average consumer as being "less sophisticated"
than they currently do: less sophisticated than the rational ideal,
less sophisticated than commercial counterparties, and, most
importantly, less sophisticated than the judges themselves. In so
doing, judges also should take into account the average level of
financial literacy of the cohort in question, relevant cognitive
biases, and situational vulnerability to further fit the standard on
a case-by-case basis. Put simply, the "average consumer" should be
deemed by courts to be "per se averagely reasonable, attentive,
and/or even naturally vulnerable, without imposing or requiring
an artificial level of attention or reasonableness."' This is better
than continuing to hold consumers to a standard of rationality that
does not reflect how most people actually think or behave.
How sophisticated, in the end, is the average person? That
is the question that judges should ask themselves before venturing
a ruling based on their subjective perception of objective human
behavior.
How PEOPLE BEHAVE
This Part discusses how "[c]ognitive biases and constraints
cause individuals to depart systematically from rational choice
models of decision-making." 2 It further treats the limitations of
information as a method of consumer empowerment and describes
the roles that poor financial literacy and the sophistication gap play
in painting an accurate picture of the "average" consumer.
A. Rational Choice Theory
The neoclassical model assumes "that consumers and firms
rationally optimize their choices, given their preferences,
information, and the incentives they face." 3 In rational choice
theory, "consumers are viewed as rational actors able to estimate
the probabilistic outcomes of uncertain decisions and to select the
outcome which maximises their sense of well-being at the time the
1 Rossella Incardona & Cristina Poncib6, The average consumer, the
unfair commercial practices directive, and the cognitive revolution, 2007 J.

CONS. POL'Y 30:21-38, 36 (2007).

Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions:
Conveying Cautionary Warnings in Corporate Forward-Looking Statements,
2

2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 935 (2005).
3 Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2014).
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decision is made."4 More robust versions of rational choice
presuppose that "consumers' marketplace decisions reflect their
own financial self-interest," rather than simply a near-tautological
personal "well-being" or utility.5

As we will see, present-day conceptions of the "average" or
"reasonable" consumer in US and EU law "derive[] from
neoclassical economic thinking."6 Thus, consumer protection law
in these jurisdictions largely "treats consumers as rational actors
with stable preferences who use available information to make
decisions that maximize their welfare." 7 Under this framework, it
is "assume[d] that people are motivated and able to price-shop, that
they will costlessly observe and evaluate all alternatives with
reference to a pre-existing set of internal preferences, and that ...
they will costlessly obtain the information and education
necessary" to understand product attributes such as price or
competing features. 8
Of course, modern rational choice adherents "recognize that
people may lack sufficient cognitive skills, information, or time to
make decisions this way."9 This has prompted what Professor Mak
terms an "empowerment model": "[r]ather than prescribing what
consumers can and cannot do, [the neo-classical] aim is to put
consumers in a position where they are able to navigate the
financial market and to make choices that are beneficial to their
welfare." 10 Put simply, "[p]roblems arising from a 'lack of
[consumer] understanding' or 'an inability' to protect one's
interest do not fit nearly into any of the categories of the
conventional
neoclassical
market
failures--externalities,
Incardona & Poncib6, supra note 1, at 30.
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 741 (2006).
6 Jennifer Davis, Revisiting the average consumer: an uncertain
presence in European trade mark law, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 15, 21 (2015).
7 Harvard Law Review Association, Consumer Financial RegulationCFPB's Final Payday Lending Rule Deems It an "Unfair" and "Abusive"
Practice to Make Payday Loans Without Determining Borrower Ability to
Repay - Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1852, 1856 (2018).
8 Willis, supra note 5, at 741-42.
9 Id.; See also Jeffrey J. Minneti, Is It Too Easy Being Green? A
Behavioral Economics Approach to Determining Whether to Regulate
Environmental Marketing Claims, 55 LoY. L. REV. 653, 683-85 (2009).
10 Vanessa Mak, The Myth of the 'Empowered Consumer': Lessons from
Financial Literacy Studies, 1 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MKT. L. 254, 255 (2012)
[hereinafter Mak 2012b].
4

5
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information asymmetries, or imperfect competition."" This is
because "even a somewhat bounded theory of the rational
consumer predicts that consumers' marketplace decisions will be
welfare-maximizing," as long as the cost of obtaining, processing,
and understanding the necessary information is relatively low.12
B. The DisclosureDefault
First and foremost, then, "from the neo-classical
perspective it is assumed that for the representative consumer to
be able to make rational (i.e., utility-maximising) choices, it is
necessary for him or her to have access to sufficient, reliable
information."' 3 To that end, "[t]he credo embedded in EU [and US]
consumer law is that more information is always better for the
consumer." 14 As the reasoning goes, "if the market failure consisted
[of] asymmetries of information, the law could restore symmetryand thereby well-functioning markets-by mandating that the
better informed party (the trader) provides the less informed party
(the consumer) with the relevant information." 5
This "informational fix assumes that consumers will make
self-interested, well-informed, rational probabilistic financial
choices" once the information asymmetry is corrected.1 6 In the EU,
for example, "[n]umerous mandatory disclosures illustrate an
apparent act of faith that EU consumers are capable of making
informed decisions so long as the relevant-if abundantinformation is presented to them in a comprehensible manner."' 7
That is, "the information paradigm defines what is expected of a
good average consumer: it is one who avails herself of the
opportunity to read contract terms or, when she does not, accepts
that it is fair that she should be bound by the small print she has
11 Patrick M. Corrigan, "Abusive" Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank's
Behaviorally Informed Authority over Consumer Credit Markets and its
Application to Teaser Rates, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 125,141 (2015)

(note).

Willis, supra note 5, at 742.
Davis, supra note 6, at 21.
Genevieve Helleringer & Anne-Lise Sibony, European Consumer
Protection Through the Behavioral Lens, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 607, 622
(2017).
15 Id. at 620.
16 Willis, supra note 5, at 743.
17 Helleringer & Sibony, supra note 14, at 617-18; See also Lisa
Waddington, Vulnerable and confused: the protection of "vulnerable"
12
13
14

consumers under EU law, 2013 EUR. L REV. 757, 765 (2013).
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not read." 18 Yet what happens when reality does not conform to
these presumptions?
In fact, "[t]he availability, or even the intelligibility, or
information ... does not always ensure its effective appraisal given
that people may not understand, or properly evaluate, the relevant
information." 19 As Professor Ulen notes, "[c]onsumers ... often
find themselves overwhelmed by the amount of information with
which they must deal. Consumers have a limited ability to retain
the information in working memory (typically retaining no more
than a third of information disclosed to them); and the mandatory
information can have undesirable unintended consequences (for
instance, crowding out useful information [])." 20 Moreover, "before
information can even be processed by the consumer, it must, at the
very least, gain his or her attention. Consumers may not notice or
read information ...

because they have very limited resources and

cannot hear and see everything that surrounds them." 2 1
Indeed, there is substantial evidence that too much
information will actually reduce our capacity as rational actors.
"As a result of information overload, all people reduce most
decisions to a small number of salient characteristics. . . . Studies of

more complex decisions demonstrate that as complexity increases,
people rely more heavily on suboptimal simplifying strategies." 22
To this end, "when consumers have information about a higher
number of individual product attributes, they [may] make less
accurate decisions in purchasing that product." 23 Thus, rational
choice theory notwithstanding, "[f]uller, simpler, and more
effective disclosure . . . is often not a realistic way to adequately

rectify individual incapacity to make accurate,
judgments based on the appropriate time horizons." 2 4

informed

Helleringer & Sibony, supra note 14, at 621.
Incardona & Poncib6, supra note 1, at 32; see also Oren Bar-Gill, The
Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 754
(2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gill 2008].
20 Thomas S. Ulen, A Behavioral View of Investor Protection, 44 Loy. U.
CHI. L. J. 1357, 1370 (2013).
21 Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 32.
22 Willis, supra note 5, at 767-68.
23 Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for Supervision of
Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1339 (Apr. 2015).
24 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1598.
18

19
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C. Bounded Rationalityand Willpower
Of course, both common sense and empirical evidence tell
us that the rational ideal of neoclassical economics is seldom
reflected in real-world human behavior. "The constraints of
human reasoning cause people to make choices that often may not
maximize their utilities. ...
Cognitive and motivational
constraints, heuristics, and decision-making biases cause
systematic departures in behavior from outcomes predicted by
rational actor models."2 5 And, not only do we "make mistakes in
judgment and perception,"2 6 but we are frequently governed by
impressions and impulses that may not be grounded in deliberate,
rational thought.2 7 We have limited energy, limited memory, and
limited computational ability.2 8 We often lack self-control,2

9

we

can be distracted, rushed, or emotional,3 0 and our choices can be
affected by seemingly irrelevant criteria.3 1 "Even well-informed
consumers of a high intellectual and educational level, who would,
at least in theory, be ideally suited for rational market behavior,
may often base their decisions on customs and feelings rather than
an analytical process." 32 In short, the "average" person bears little
resemblance to the dispassionate utility-maximizers that inhabit
economics textbooks and (more pertinently) judicial opinions.
These cognitive limitations are naturally implicated in the
innumerable choices we make as consumers. Not every consumer
decision is imperfectly rational, and not every consumer exhibits
the same biases and shortcomings in their decision-making
process, let alone to the same degree. Overall, however, bounded
rationality and willpower exert a tremendous gravitational pull on
the framework of consumer choice, and any portrait of an
"'average" or "reasonable" consumer that strives for some measure
of accuracy should recognize this fact. With that in mind, this
Ripken, supra note 2, at 957.
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1603.
27 Ripken, supra note 2, at 969.
28 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Econqmics, and Psychology of Subprime
Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1121-22 (2009) [hereinafter
Bar-Gill 2009]; Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 331 (2008).
29 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1642-43.
30 Willis, supra note 5, at 769.
31 See Linda J. Demaine, Seeing is Deceiving: The Tacit Deregulation of
Deceptive Advertising, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 721 (2012); Willis, supra note 5,
at 781-84.
32 Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 35.
25

26
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paper briefly describes some systematic, predictable cognitive
features with the greatest impact on consumer behavior.
1. Intangible and Temporal Costs
First, "[b]ecause people are continuously seeking to
conserve intangible resources, including time, decision-making
does not linearly proceed from perception to attention to
evaluation to decision. Rather, that which is salient, and therefore
33
perceived with less effort, is immediately put to evaluative use."
In deciding which of two stores is more affordable, for example,
''consumers rely on prices of only a small number of highly salient
items-often only three to five.... [O]nce in a given store,
consumers can be made to pay higher prices on the non-salient
items, which are perceived in accordance with their overall image
of the store as 'low-cost.' 3 4 And, as Professor Willis has observed,
consumers are incentivized "to minimize the experience of negative
emotions during decision-making," a tendency that is "particularly
5
likely to lead to poor substantive decision outcomes."
2. Overconfidence and Overoptimism
Moreover, "[m]ost people tend towards overoptimism and
both generally and when they act as
overconfidence,
consumers. ... These tendencies shape risk perception, causing
36
people to underestimate the extent to which they are at risk." This
has particular implications for financial consumer decisions, such
as entering into credit agreements: consumers may be
overoptimistic regarding their future financial prospects and
ability to avoid future negative events, or overconfident that they
37
will be able to limit their spending to items within their budget.
Either factor can lead them to borrow more than is socially

33 Willis, supra note 5, at 757; see also Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1356;
Hanna Schebesta and Kai Purnhagen, The Behaviour of the Average
Consumer: A Little Less Normativity and a Little More Reality in the CJEU's

Case Law? Reflections on Teekanne, 2016 EUR. L. REV. 590, 595 (2016).

Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1318.
Willis, supra note 5, at 755-56.
Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud
Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 362-63 (2003).
3 See Corrigan, supra note 11, at 164; Michael G. Faure and Hanneke
3

35
36

A. Luth, Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms, 2011 J. CONS.
POL'Y 337 at 10.
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3. Anchoring, Framing, and Confirmation Bias
As the European Commission notes, "not only the content
of the information provided, but also the way the information is
presented can have a significant impact on how consumers
respond to it." 39 Furthermore, once consumers form a belief, it can
be hard to dislodge: not only do "people have a tendency to seek
out confirming evidence of their beliefs and to discount
information that contradicts their views,' 40 but, our continuing
perceptions are anchored to an initial baseline. Consumers who
have an "overall impression of a store's prices as low or high," for
example, are slow to "adjust that impression even when [the]
store's actual prices have changed." 4 1
4. Oversimplification
Consumers deal poorly with complexity. "When presented
with product attributes that they do not comprehend, some
consumers will react by ignoring the incomprehensible attributes
rather than seeking further information." 42 This is especially true
of financial contracts, as consumers "systematically underestimate
the actual contractual cost of borrowing" as a result of "focus[ing]
on a few salient terms and ignor[ing] many of the complicated
terms governing fees and penalties." 4 3 Moreover, the consumer
often "approximates, rather than calculates, the impact of the
salient dimensions that cannot be ignored." 4 4 Generally speaking,
"[c]omplexity hides the true cost of the product from the
imperfectly rational consumer"4 5 and "increases the likelihood of
See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1641.
European Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on the
Implementation/Application of Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial
Practices, SWD(2016) 163 final at 52, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/ENTXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016SC0163
[hereinafter
UCPD
Guidance 2016].
40 Ripken, supra note 2, at 965.
41 Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1350.
42 Willis, supra note 5, at 780.
43 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1641; also Van Loo, supra note 23, at
1318; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
38

39

Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1216-44 (2003).
44
45

Bar-Gill 2009, supra note 28, at 1121-22.
Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS,

Loyola Consumer Law Review

10

Vol. 32:1

irrational decision-making because consumers must process more
information." 4 6
5. Time-Inconsistent Preferences
There are many ways in which consumers' future or longerterm interests are under-served by their cognitive processes.
Consumers are present-biased, "systematically choos[ing] options
which will bring short-term benefits even though they are not the
best value offers in the long-term." 4 7 In addition, consumers tend
"to believe that their choices and preferences will remain the same
48
over time, and that there is only little room to change." Even
when consumers recognize that their short-term and long-term
interests diverge, they will hyperbolically discount, and thus
49
underweight, future costs and benefits when making decisions.
Lack of self-control due to bounded willpower is a related issue, as
consumers have difficulty resisting the temptation of short-term
benefits even if they know that their future selves will regret the
decision.5 0 "[T]here is growing evidence that self-control
play an important role in consumer borrowing
problems ...
5 1
decisions."
D. FinancialLiteracy
A separate but equally important matter is consumers'
ability to understand and assess the information with which they
are presented on a daily basis, including applying financial
concepts, performing simple calculations, and choosing between
alternatives based on sometimes subtle but meaningful differences
in terms and conditions. Yet "[b]ehavioral research indicates that
people are simply not especially skilled at calculating probabilities
in general." 52 Moreover, numerous studies in the US and Europe
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS, 18 (2012) [hereinafter
Bar-Gill 2012].
46 Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1317.
47 Anne-Francoise Lefevre & Michael Chapman, Behavioural Economics
and Financial Consumer Protection, G20/OECD TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION

at 12 (2017).

Id. at 13.
49 See Corrigan, supra note 11, at 164.
5o Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1642.
51 Id. at 1643; see also Corrigan, supra note 11, at 164-65.
52 Prentice, supra note 36, at 363; see also David A. Hoffman, The "Duty"
48

To Be A Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 549 (2006).
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suggest that most consumers lack basic financial literacy skills in
one or more areas.5 3 This alone marks a significant divergence
between the "average" consumer and the rational choice ideal.
Representatively, "[a]n SEC compilation of recent studies
observes that the United States 'is facing an economic
comprehension gap of serious proportions' and that this
widespread ignorance of financial basics 'creates great potential
for abuse."' 5 4 Likewise, when the European Commission tested
"[a]rithmetic skills ... using three simple decisions consumers are
likely to encounter frequently," a majority of respondents failed to
answer all three questions correctly.55 Professor Lusardi and her
colleagues have measured financial literacy in the US and EU
using a different set of questions "covering fundamental concepts
of economics and finance, expressed in everyday terms, that
require simple interest rate calculations and an understanding of
the workings of inflation and risk diversification." 5 6 The results
demonstrated low levels of financial literacy across the board, with
"women perform[ing] significantly worse than men."5 7
Furthermore, financial literacy levels worsen with respect
to issues of consumer debt. Professor Lusardi finds "strikingly low
levels of debt literacy across the U.S. population," with only onethird of all respondents able to "apply concepts of interest
compounding to everyday situations or understand the workings
of credit cards."5 8 This can be seen empirically: studies have shown
that "a majority of consumers who accepted a new credit card offer
featuring a low introductory rate did not switch out-to a new card
5 See Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial
Experiences, and Overindebtedness 2-3, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
(Working Paper No. 14808, 2009) http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4808.pdf;
Tabea Bucher-Koenen, Annamaria Lusardi, Rob Alessie, and Maarten van
Rooij, How financially literate are women? An overview and new insights, 56, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH (Working Paper No. 20793, 2014)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20793.pdf.
5 Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for
Replacing "The Reasonable Investor" with "The Least Sophisticated Investor"
in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473, 494 (2006).
55 European Commission, Consumer Empowerment in the EU, 6, SEC
(2011)
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumer-empowermenteu_2011
en.pdf [hereinafter EC 2011].
56 Bucher-Koenen et al., supra note 53, at 5; see also Lusardi & Tufano,
supra note 53, at 1.
57 Bucher-Koenen et al., supra note 53, at 6.
58 Lusardi & Tufano, supra note 53, at 1.
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with a new introductory rate-after the expiration of the
introductory period, even though their debt did not decline after
the initial introductory period ended." 5 9 And, of course, "many
consumers pay high interest rates on large credit card balances
while holding liquid assets that yield low returns."6 0
Overall, "[i]ndividuals with low financial knowledge are
found to be less likely to plan for retirement . .. and are more likely
to make financial mistakes such as borrowing at high rates,
61
making financial losses permanent, or failing to minimize fees."
In short, it is safe to say that the "average consumer" is likely to
demonstrate some measure of financial illiteracy, above and
beyond any other cognitive limitations.
E. The SophisticationGap
Consumer behavior, critically, does not exist in a vacuum.
Rather, counterparties can and do exploit the bounded rationality
and low financial literacy of consumers, both at the retail level and
in the context of consumer finance. After all, "[i]f consumers make
systematic mistakes, these mistakes can be expected to induce a
reaction from sellers[,] because any factor that affects the demand
62
for a product can be expected to induce a reaction from sellers."
Furthermore, while all humans are imperfectly rational to some
degree, lenders and retailers are in a far better position than
consumers to take advantage of the other side's cognitive
vulnerabilities on a systematic basis. It is therefore crucial that any
conception of an "average consumer" recognize the sophistication
gap that exists in the overwhelming majority of consumer
transactions.
"[T]oday's retailers are not just large versions of the momand-pop hardware store of the past; they are data-driven,
psychologically-informed institutions that systematically tailor
63
prices and products to consumers' shopping shortcomings."
Indeed, "[d]epartments of consumer research at most major
corporations devote substantial effort to learning how to sell their
products more effectively than their competitors by using
psychological insights into irrationality." 6 4 In particular,

61
62
63

Bar-Gill 2008, supra note 19, at 762-63.
Id. at 764.
Bucher-Koenen et al., supra note 53, at 14-15.
Bar-Gill 2008, supra note 19, at 765.
Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1324-25.

6

Norman I. Silber, Reasonable Behavior at the CFPB, 7 BROOK. J.

59
60
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"[r]etailers study [consumers'] decision-making limits closely,"
using "modern decision science ...
to provide an analytical,
systematic access to the autopilot system and, hence, to the implicit
level of purchase decision-making."6 5 They can then "leverag[e] an
array of [consumer] biases" to increase sales and maximize
profits. 66
Lenders, too, "make a living by studying consumer
psychology and figuring out how to manipulate it... . In consumer
credit markets, consumers who underestimate how much and how
long they will borrow will use credit more, providing the
complementarity that incentivizes lenders to actively encourage
such false beliefs." 67 An asymmetry inherently exists in the lenderborrower relationship, as "[a] lender who understands the
imperfectly rational response to complexity can use complexity to
her advantage-to create an appearance of a lower total price
without actually lowering the price." 68 In fact, "lenders can exploit
even small mispredictions about future behavior by designing
contracts that pack much of the cost of borrowing into terms that
the consumer does not think she will trigger. As a result, the
consumer substantially underestimates the cost of credit and
overborrows." 69 No similar tool exists for a consumer to exploit the
biases of the lender.
Moreover, the sophistication level of sellers is increasing at
a widening pace, a phenomenon Professor Van Loo attributes to
"technology and scale."7 0 "The former Chief Science Office of
Amazon notes that retailers have started an 'arms race' to hire
mathematicians and statisticians to analyze the results of in-store
experiments and to develop behavioral modeling algorithms from
their troves of data." 7 And, while sellers "have developed gamechanging sophistication in an increasingly complex market,"
consumers have only "gained helpful search technologies," which
have "major limitations" and are largely controlled by sellers "to
exploit consumer decision-making limits."72
The sophistication gap brings with it an asymmetrical
CORP. FIN. &COM. L. 87, 101 (2012).
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1327.
Id.; see also Corrigan, supra note 11, at 174-75.
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1648.
Bar-Gill 2009, supra note 28, at 1122.
Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1651.
Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1331.
Id. at 1331-32.
Id. at 1334.
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social cost. "When [assumptions of rationality] are not reliable,
then freedom of contract shifts from a system to enhance consumer
welfare, and social welfare more generally, to a tool used by more
sophisticated parties to take consumers' money without giving
value in return."7 3 For example, "the lender has incentives to
extend credit to risky borrowers who are more likely to trip up on
the penalties and pay higher interest rates. ... the harsh penalty
terms that increase the likelihood of default are the very terms that
are most profitable."7 4
Likewise, in the retail world, "[m]anufacturers have
frequently decreased the quantity of product while maintaining
the same packaging appearance.... Such changes remain
unnoticed by most consumers, amounting to an unperceived perunit price increase resulting from consumer inattention."7 5 Online,
"sellers can make shopping for individual products complex by
lengthening descriptions and making it difficult to quickly assess
the full costs of an item among numerous choices." 7 6 As a result,
"consumers overpay for goods by significant amounts at great cost
to society." 7 7
These features-bounded rationality and willpower,
information overload, low financial literacy, and asymmetric
sophistication levels-interact to create a market landscape in
which consumers operate at an enduring disadvantage when
making decisions, particularly concerning "increasingly complex
retail financial products."7 8 "A financial product's complexity is
commonly seen as a key enabler of irrational decision-making," not
only obscuring the product's total cost but causing consumers "to
use mental shortcuts and raising the costs of information
acquisition." 7 9 Firms are incentivized "to design their contracts in
ways that exacerbate consumers' decisional limitations," such as
by "packing more of the overall contract cost into nonsalient,
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European Commission, Consumer Decision-Making in Retail
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poorly understood terms."8 0 Consumers can thus be induced into
"underestimating the cost of credit and borrowing more than is
socially optimal" due to imperfect rationality.8 1 Such consumer
mistakes maximize the profits of firms but decrease total welfare. 8 2

WHAT JUDGES Do
Judges, however, typically acknowledge none of these
cognitive constraints and limitations. Despite its importance to
consumer decision-making, courts rarely, if ever, take financial
literacy into account when considering the characteristics of the
"average consumer." Nor does the prevailing judicial
interpretation of a reasonable consumer usually recognize a
sophistication gap between consumers and counterparties, or the
incentive firms have to engage in exploitative strategic behavior.
And, with respect to consumer cognition, judges generally adhere
to rational choice presumptions and assume a relatively high
degree of attentiveness, forbearance, and critical thinking. Courts
do, however, have the power to consider consumers in a more
realistic fashion; this paper argues that doing so would be
beneficial to consumers and the market alike.
A. JudicialLeeway
Jurisprudence in the US and EU uses concepts of the
"reasonable" and "average" consumer, respectively, as benchmarks
against which to assess the fairness of commercial practices. In
both jurisdictions, judges have a significant amount of leeway in
how they interpret "reasonable" or "average" human behavior.8 3
Because these standards are objective rather than subjective, the
court is tasked with putting itself in the shoes of consumers as a
whole and "taking into account the general presfimed consumers'
expectations. "84
Thus, courts are given broad guidelines to exercise their
individual perceptions of reasonableness in consumer behavior.
Even where a statutory standard exists-as with the codification
of the CJEU's "reasonably observant and circumspect" standard
80 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1643; also Bar-Gill 2009, supra note
28, at 1076-77.
81 Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1644.
82 See id.; Warren & Bar-Gill, supra note 73, at 7.
83 See Parts IV and V, infra.
8 UCPD Guidance 2016, supra note 39, at 38.
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in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive ("UCPD")-it
ultimately rests with judges to apply the standard to case-specific
circumstances based on their assessment of a reasonable
consumer's level of understanding, attention, judgment, and
decision-making. The UCPD itself notes that "[t]he average
consumer is not a statistical test. National courts and authorities
will have to exercise their own faculty of judgment . .. to determine
the typical reaction of the average consumer in a given case."85
The concept of a legally determined "reasonable person"
86
exists in many contexts beyond consumer protection law. "Courts

.

reach for the reasonable person when the relevant standard
requires some attentiveness to the individual qualities of the
litigant as well as to the objective content of the legal norm."8 7
Indeed, "a benefit of the reasonable person standard is that it. .
can be applied with sensitivity to the myriad facts and
circumstances which might influence the thoughts or behavior of
a reasonable person in different situations."8 8 In many contexts,
however, especially in the US, the standard relies first and
foremost "on the collective wisdom of the jury as a proxy for the
conscience of the community," rather than the judge. 89 This paper
argues that in consumer protection law in particular, there is a risk
inherent in judges taking and applying an objective standard of
reasonableness "to determine what an average person could and
should expect in the circumstances of the case" 90-- especially when
the result is a picture that does not reflect the reality of human
85

Unfair

Commercial

Practices

Directive

("UCPD"),

DIRECTIVE

2005/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL (May 11, 2005),

(concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal18,
Recital
market)
content/ENITXT/?uri=celex%3A32005LOO29.
86 See
generally Christopher Jackson, Reasonable Persons,
Reasonable Circumstances, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 651 (2013); Mayo Moran,

The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233 (2010).
87 Moran, supra note 86, at 1233.
88 Amanda M. Rose, The "Reasonable Investor" of Federal Securities
Law: Insights from Tort Law's "Reasonable Person" & Suggested Reforms,
43 J. CORP. L. 77, 83 (Fall 2017).

Id. at 84.
Vanessa Mak, The 'Average Consumer' of EU Law in Domestic
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behavior.
B. Assumptions of Rationality
By and large, judge-made standards of reasonableness in
the consumer protection arena adhere to the neoclassical
assumption that individuals are rational actors. In Europe, courts
have "developed a judicial portrayal of the consumer as sensible,
attentive, and cautious, as well as able to analyze, critically and
discerningly, the messages behind advertising and commercial
practices in general." 91 The United States Supreme Court,
meanwhile, "promulgat[es] a strong presumption that persons and
businesses make purely rational choices with a singular intent to
maximize their wealth." 92
Both strands of jurisprudence have roots in neoclassical
ideology. As Professor Langevoort explains, "The early 1980s
brought the emergence of the efficient market hypothesis to the
forefront of thinking. ... [T]he idea that markets are extremely
difficult to fool-the underpinning of many of the [judicial]
heuristics-was both accessible and resonant to many judges."9 3
Part IV.A below describes how the Federal Trade Commission
enshrined neoclassical rational choice assumptions into the
regulatory and judicial standard for US consumer protection law.
Likewise, as Part V.A details, the contours of the "average
consumer" in the EU had their genesis in free movement case law
concerned above all about market integration. 94 Thus, "EU law
does not seek to protect the 'casual consumer,' but regards
consumers as responsible individuals.

...

By adopting a restrictive

notion of the protection that an 'average consumer' deserves, the
Member States' possibilities for maintaining stricter rules of
consumer protection become limited." 95
These ideological roots blur the lines between normative
and descriptive judicial perceptions of consumer behavior. That is,
in promulgating a vision of the rational consumer, are courts
Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 30.
Michael J. Kaufman, Summary Pre-Judgment: The Supreme Court's
Profound, Pervasive and Problematic Presumption About Human Behavior,
43 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 593, 595 (Spring 2012).
93 Donald C. Langevoort, Are Judges Motivated to Create "Good"
Securities Fraud Doctrine?, 51 EMORY L. J. 309, 315-16 (2002) [hereinafter
Langevoort 2002].
9 Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 5-6.
9 Id. at 6.
91

92
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seeking to set forth "what the presumed expectations of an average
consumer should be in a given context"-thus offering an
aspirational benchmark to shape consumer behavior-or is their
task to describe what the presumed expectations of an average
consumer, in fact, are?9 6 While this issue is explored further in Part
VI, this paper argues that there must necessarily be some
descriptive component to determining, for example, whether a
"reasonable consumer" would find a particular commercial
practice misleading or unfair. After all, the UCPD does not
command judges to apply a standard delineating how an average
consumer should act, but rather "to determine" an average
consumer's "typical reaction." 97
Moreover, to the extent that a normative standard seeks to
incentivize better behavior from consumers, there are reasons to
believe that the incentives that an aspirational standard would
provide in consumer protection law are minimal in practice-as
opposed to, say, tort law-and, in any event, are outweighed by
the benefit of accurately reflecting the behavior of average,
ordinary humans in a field of law that purports to exist to protect
them. Regardless, this paper proceeds under the twin assumptions
that, first, the reasonable consumer standard in the US and the
average consumer standard in the EU both purport to cover
largely the same ground (in other words, there is little conceptual
space for a vision of an "average" consumer who is not
"reasonable") and, second, that both seek to describe actual
behavior, rather than prescribe ideal behavior, to at least some
degree.
C. JudicialBiases
Judges, being human, are not immune to cognitive biases.
Limits on time, memory, and informational processing ability
mean that "even highly qualified judges inevitably rely on
cognitive decision-making processes that can produce systematic
errors in judgment." 98 Arguably, the roles of intuition and
heuristics in judicial decision-making, and the mistakes that flow
therefrom, are nowhere more evident than when a judge is tasked
with assessing the reasonableness of a given action.
96

Id. at 4; see also Davis, supra note 6, at 16, Rose, supra note 88, at

86.
UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the
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"In the absence of good data, ... judges asked to determine
what a reasonable [consumer] would do have little choice but to
draw implicitly on their own knowledge and experience" as well as
their intuition and common sense. 99 That is, if indeed "[t]he
average consumer is not a statistical test,"100 judges must
necessarily craft an objective benchmark from their own
subjective sense of what is or is not reasonable. This presents
several hazards if the goal is to arrive at a determination that
reflects median consumer behavior.
First, because all judges are naturally consumers
themselves, they "have an anecdotal base of experience from which
to draw, which ...
will influence their normative judgments
considerably." 10 1 But "most successful people ...

overestimate

their own... reasonableness, especially in hindsight," meaning
that judges may have an idealized belief about their own
susceptibility to the commercial practice in question when looking
backward.102
In addition, even if a judge accurately assesses her own
threshold of reasonableness as a consumer, "she may overestimate
the number of others who would act similarly."10 3 Professor
Kaufman argues that judges-who, it may be presumed, are
better-educated, more financially literate, and more criticallyminded as a group than the median member of society, even if they
too fall short of the rational ideal-often "are prone to . . . a false

certainty bias in which they neglect to account for the ways that
their individual experience shapes their common sense." 104 And, as
Professor Langevoort notes, "Judges are especially confident in
their ability to be rationally skeptical of the self-serving motives of
others, particularly in financial transactions," because "[a] lawyer's
training emphasizes skepticism and the need to search diligently
for risk." 0 5 Judges who impute this skepticism to the average
consumer may find themselves assuming that people in generalas a descriptive matter, not an aspirational one-are far more
discerning, attentive, and resistant to persuasion than they actually
are.
99 Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus.
LAw. 481, 493 (1994) [hereinafter Langevoort 1994].
100 UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
101 Langevoort 2002, supra note 93, at 317.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Kaufman, supra note 92, at 597.
105 Langevoort 1994, supra note 99, at 494.
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Left to themselves, then, there are reasons to think that
judges will not be adept at understanding how an average
consumer will react to contractual complexity or marketing
blandishments that target bounded rationality and willpower or
low financial literacy. The presence of these judicial biases
highlights the need to fashion a reasonable consumer test that is
more cognizant of, and hews more closely to, real-world human
behavior.
D. Why It Matters
There are several reasons why it is important whether the
courts' vision of an average consumer is grounded in reality. To
begin with, advancing an inaccurate view of human behavior as
being accurate undermines the judicial mission. As we will see in
Parts IV and V, the application of these standards is generally
presented as descriptive, rather than normative and aspirational.
The FTC's adoption of a reasonable consumer standard, for
example, "is based upon the premise that consumers generally are
capable of protecting themselves from unscrupulous trade
practices." 106 If, in fact, most consumers are not as capable of
protecting themselves as judges applying this standard presume,
then courts are under-deterring practices that reduce social
welfare.107

Further, to the extent that an unrealistic consumer standard
has disproportionate impact on certain groups over others, it
perpetuates imbalances of power, particularly when those groups
are less able to bear the attendant risk. As Professor Weatherill
observes, "choosing the identity of the benchmark consumer-asvictim is clearly of vital importance to the practical implications of
a regime designed to control commercial practices which will not
have a uniform impact on consumers precisely because consumers
themselves do not form a homogeneous group."108
While nobody can be expected to match the neoclassical
ideal of the perfectly rational actor, some demographic groups are
systematically better situated than others to minimize welfare loss
Jack E. Karns, The Federal Trade Commission's Evolving Deception
Policy, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 399, 411 (1988).
107 See Warren & Bar-Gill, supra note 73, at 7.
108 Stephen Weatherill, Who is the "average consumer"?, in The
regulation of unfair commercial practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New
rules and new techniques at 1 (S. Weatherill & U. Bernitz, eds.) (Oxford: Hart
Publishing 2007).
106
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in a system that demands such rationality from consumers.
Notably, less financially literate consumers will suffer more if the
"average consumer" bar is set too high. Studies have shown that
age, gender, socio-economic class, education, and ethnicity are
broadly indicative of an individual's level of financial literacy. 109
For example, "[f]inancial experience and knowledge is possessed
disproportionately by the well-educated middle and upper
classes,"1 10 while "low-income families suffer from reduced
cognition overall-especially on money-related topics-due to the
many general stresses of poverty and the extra stress that monetary
decision-making entails when money is tight.""'
Minorities,
women,
and
the
elderly
also
are
disproportionately affected. "African-American and Latino
consumers on average possess less financial and document literacy
as a result of less financial education and experience."" 2 Professors
Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi have found that financial illiteracy "is
particularly severe among women" of all ages throughout the US
and EU, which is an alarming result given women's "fewer
available resource and higher life expectancies."' 1 3 And, "older
adults also demonstrate more limited document and financial
literacy skills than do adults under fifty-five years of age," due in
part "to degraded cognitive abilities caused by the aging
process."114
At bottom, then, the "average consumer" as currently
construed is in many respects implicitly measured against the
standard of a white, well-educated, middle-aged, upper-to-middleclass man-who themselves, of course, are still subject to a host of
cognitive biases and limitations. If courts were to recognize that
the average consumer does not necessarily have all of the privileges
of that cohort, it might lead to more robust consumer protection
across all demographics, rather than only a few.
The prevailing interpretation of "reasonable" consumer
behavior perpetuates an imbalance of power in another way. By
failing to account for the widening sophistication gap between
consumers and sellers, courts incentivize strategic behavior
designed to exploit cognitive weaknesses and limitations, even if

109
110
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that behavior leads to "adverse distributive consequences."' 5
Firms that needlessly increase the complexity of contracts" 6 or
intentionally "mak[e] it difficult to quickly assess the full costs of
an item among numerous choices"117 are given a windfall if judges
effectively blame consumers in those circumstances for not being
sufficiently rational. Courts contribute to ongoing social welfare
loss and further entrench existing wealth disparities if their version
of "reasonableness requires the consumer to match wits with the
more astute vendor who often has given considerable time and
attention to developing promotional techniques designed to
encourage the buyer to make an unreasonable decision."118
Finally, it may be possible to combat or mitigate ingrained
judicial biases if judges are acculturated to understand that the
"average consumer" is significantly less sophisticated than the
rational actor ideal or, indeed, the judges themselves. In explaining
why judges often apply overly broad, lazy, or simplistic heuristics
in cases of complex securities fraud, Professor Langevoort
postulates that carefully-crafted judicial doctrine can be "adopted
and extended by a mindless judge or two," gathering steam, until
"the institutionally legitimate pull of precedent" takes over." 9 At
this point, he says, "the [now overbroad] precedent gradually
becomes more a self-fulfilling prophecy," gaining de facto
acceptance among courts and ultimately "crowd[ing] out" the
previous, superior doctrine.12 0 Perhaps something like this can
happen in reverse: if a sufficient minority of influential courts
begin to take greater notice of behavioral realities when deciding
consumer protection cases, it may trigger a cascade of like-oriented
jurisprudence until the rational choice approach to consumer
behavior is seen as outdated and stale.

US FEDERAL LAW
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") are charged with enforcing
federal statutory prohibitions against unfair, deceptive, and-in
the case of the CFPB-abusive commercial practices. While much
Bar-Gill 2009, supra note 28, at 1083.
See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1643.
117 Van Loo, supra note 23, at 1317.
118 Karns, supra note 106, at 413.
119 Langevoort 2002, supra note 93, at 312-13.
120 Id. at 313.
115
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of US consumer protection law occurs at the state levell21 and
through private rights of action,1 22 this paper focuses on the FTC
and CFPB as the principal engines of the federal consumer
protection scheme with respect to unfair and deceptive acts and
practices ("UDAP").
In theory, state UDAP law largely mirrors federal law and
can be preempted when the two conflict;1 23 most states also direct
that "due consideration and great weight shall be given to the
interpretations of the [FTC] and the federal courts" regarding
UDAP standards. 124 Practically speaking, however, there are
important differences in scope and content between the two UDAP
regimes, 125 including the necessary threshold for deceptive
practices.1 2 6 An exploration of judicial treatment of the reasonable
consumer under state UDAP law is worthwhile but beyond the
remit of this paper.
A. The FTC and the Reasonable Consumer
US federal law prohibits "unfair and deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce," without defining these
terms.1 2 7 Traditionally, courts considered acts "deceptive" if they
had "a tendency or capacity to deceive" their target audience,1 28 a
broad standard that offered a measure of protection to "the unwary
and foolish member of the buying public, as well as the diligent."1 2 9
In 1983, however, the FTC issued a Policy Statement saying that
only those practices that would "mislead [a] consumer acting

121 See Spencer W. Waller, Jillian G. Brady, R.J. Acosta, & Jennifer Fair,
Consumer Protection in the United States: An Overview (January 12, 2011),
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122
123
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124
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125
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reasonably in the circumstances" could be considered deceptive. 130
Driven by neoclassical economics, this Policy Statement effectively
replaced a standard recognizing the capacity of sellers to exploit
cognitive limitations of consumers with one that, depending on
judicial interpretations of "reasonable," would protect only
rational actors. 131
Prior to the Policy Statement, the prevailing standard
presumed that "consumers did not, and should not be expected to,
exhibit entirely rational attentiveness to the advertisements and
representations, or terms and conditions, of the bargains they
struck." 132 In 1941, for example, the Sixth Circuit found that a
literally true but potentially misleading advertisement was
deceptive because "[t]he average individual does not make, and
often is incapable of making, minute calculations" to parse the full
costs of an advertised credit plan. 133 By "abandon[ing] the
language of the traditional deception standard," 134 the FTC guided
courts "away from the seller's responsibility to design sales
practices that did not confuse, exaggerate, or conceal qualities or
terms, and toward permitting strategies of confusion when they did
not preclude smart and attentive consumers from averting
injury."13 s
Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., a 2016 case from the paradigmatically
consumer-friendly Ninth Circuit, provides an example. The
plaintiff in Ebner sued a cosmetics manufacturer, claiming that the
design and packaging of its Sugar lip balm were deceptive and
misleading under California law on the following bases: first,
although Sugar's label accurately stated that each tube contained
4.3 grams of lip product, only 75 percent of the product advanced
past the tube opening and was therefore "reasonably accessible to
the consumer."1 36 This contrasted with other comparable lip
products, which made "all or more of the advertised product

FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), Letter from FTC
Chair James C. Miller III to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, House
Committee on Energy and Commerce [hereinafter FTC Policy Statement],
appended to Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984).
131 See Silber, supra note 64, at 92-95; Karns, supra note 106, at 41113.
132 Silber, supra note 64, at 92.
133 Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 182 (6th Cir. 1941).
134 Karns, supra note 106, at 409.
135 Silber, supra note 64, at 96.
136 Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2016).
130

2019

Bringing Down the Average

25

weight accessible" above the tube.1 3 7 Second, each unit of
packaging and product together weighed approximately 29
grams-almost seven times the product itself-including a 5.35
gram weight at the tube's base. The plaintiff alleged that this
"create[d] the misleading impression that each unit has a larger
quantity of lip product than it actually contains." 3 8
Relying largely on the "accurate net weight label," the
Ninth Circuit held that no reasonable consumer could be misled
by Sugar's packaging or design. 139 Regarding the design, the court
contended that a reasonable consumer "understands that some
product may be left in the tube to anchor the bullet in place," and
since the label did not state how much of the product's net weight
would be accessible, the "knowledge that some additional product
lies below the tube's opening is sufficient to dispel any
deception."1 4 0 Likewise, the court stated that the packaging was
not misleading because it displayed the product's actual weight
and "no reasonable consumer expects the weight or overall size of
the packaging to reflect directly the quantity of product contained
therein." 14 1
The Ebner holding is instructive in several respects. To
start, it demonstrates the risk of placing a reasonableness
determination solely in the hands of the judiciary. Whether or not
one agrees with the result, surely a jury is better positioned to
assess whether reasonable consumers would find Sugar's design
and packaging misleading than a three-judge appellate panel that
is significantly better educated and more intelligent than the
average American. Yet here, the court affirmed outright dismissal
of these claims, early in the litigation, as so facially implausible that
the plaintiff could not possibly be entitled to relief. 142
The court also reached its result by ignoring certain
behavioral and cognitive realities. Consumers who see that the net
weight of a product is 4.3 grams cannot necessarily estimate how
much "4.3 grams" will translate to in terms of total accessible lip
product, especially contained within a package weighing 29 grams
and a tube weighing nearly 10 grams. Given the way humans
Id.
Id.
139 Id. at 966-67. The court's test "require[d] a probability
'that a
significant portion of . .
targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the
circumstances, could be misled."'
140 Id. at 965-66 (emphasis in original).
141 Id. at 967.
142 See id.
137
138
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process information and our limited computational ability, it is
plausible that someone holding a hefty package might
overestimate the quantity of lip product contained within, even if
the weight of that product is accurately stated on the packaging.
Moreover, the court opines that any reasonable consumer
would know that some product would be left in the tube and that
the weight of the packaging will not "reflect directly the quantity
of the product contained therein." 143 But this misstates the issue:
the question is not "some," but "how much," and there is surely a
point where a reasonable consumer could feel aggrieved by the
percentage of product weight that is not accessible or by the stark
disparity of packaging-to-product ratio. Perhaps 25 percent of the
product being inaccessible does not cross this line-would 40
percent? 60 percent? A jury could answer! The court, however,
does not even acknowledge that such a line exists.

B. The CFPB:A Step Fonvard?
Created as part of the Dodd-Frank Act following the global
financial crisis, the CFPB represents a potentially seismic shift in
the American . consumer protection landscape. The statutory
authority for the CFPB in the consumer finance context covers not
only unfair and deceptive but "abusive" trade practicessomething that the FTC has never been tasked to address.144
Furthermore, while the statute generally leaves the existing scope
of unfair and deceptive practices undisturbed, 14 5 the standard for
abusive practices is striking in its express incorporation of
behavioral concepts.1 4 6
Dodd-Frank defines as abusive any act or practice that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service; or (2) takes unreasonableadvantage
of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions of
the product or service; (B) the inability of the consumer
to protect [their] interests . . . in selecting or using a
consumer financial product or service; or (C) the
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 5531 (a) (2010).
See Joshua Roquemore, The CFPB's Ambiguous "Abusive"
Standard, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 191, 192-94 (2018).
146 See Corrigan, supra note 11, at 140; Harvard, supra note 7, at 1856.
143
144
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reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person
to act in the interests of the consumer. 4 7
In other words, sellers who exploit the bounded rationality
of consumers-as manifested, for example, in a systematic
underestimation of the future costs of a credit contract-arguably
will run afoul of this statute, even if the seller did not itself cause
the consumer to underestimate those costs. 14 8 Thus, this standard
"adds to the consumer protection regulatory scheme the [explicit]
authority to address problems that originate in the consumer's
imperfect rationality or willpower."1 49
Moreover, the "abusive" standard both facilitates and
guides the judicial use of behavioral concepts in consumer law.
Critics of the provision say it lacks "clarity on how to recognize
risks a given consumer can identify,... or when [counterparties
have] taken 'unreasonable' advantage of consumer bias, as
opposed to simply engaging in a shrewd business decision." 5 0 To
the extent this is true, however, these are things that courts have
leave to address and interpret, much as they must decide when a
consumer is "acting reasonably" under the FTC's deceptiveness
standard.
The CFPB's use of its "abusive" authority has been
relatively sparing so far, and the lines between the unfair,
deceptive, and abusive standards are often blurred by the agency's
"tendency to allege two or more standards for the same act or
practice."' 5 ' Thus, courts heretofore have had little opportunity to
describe the boundaries of "abusive" practices or align the
standard with their view of consumer behavior. Yet there is some
indication that both the CFPB and courts understand the agency's
authority-whether under the "abusive" standard or not-to
extend beyond- "harms that rational consumers could not
reasonably avoid" 152 and encompass practices exploiting
consumers' bounded rationality and willpower. 5 3
In October 2017, for instance, the CFPB finalized a rule
12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2010) (emphases added).
See Harvard, supra note 7, at 1858; Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse:
The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial Protection Act's "Abusive"
147
148

Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 122-23 (2011).

Corrigan, supra note 11, at 140.
Roquemore, supra note 145, at 195.
Id. at 196.
Harvard, supra note 7, at 1856.
For a recent example, see CFPB v. Think Finance LLC, 2018 WL
3707911 (D. Mont. 2018).
149
150
151
152
153
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,

requiring that payday lenders "determine consumers' ability to
154
repay ... before issuing certain high-cost, small-dollar loans."
Such loans "commonly lead to 'debt traps,"' in which "a borrower
is repeatedly unable to pay a loan and must re-borrow, paying
additional fees each time."1 55 The agency drew from behavioral
economics to argue that such practices were both unfair and
biases." 15 6
cognitive
consumers'
"emphasizing
abusive,
Specifically, "[t]he CFPB reasoned that harm caused by debt traps
was not reasonably avoidable because borrowers systematically
underestimate the likelihood that they will be unable to repay.. .
the number of times they will re-borrow, and the severity of the
financial injuries likely to ensue."1 5 7 Such borrowers understand
the terms of the loans before borrowing, but are nevertheless
"unable to judge the degree of risk," leaving them exploited by
8
lenders who profit when they fail to repay.15
There are many potentially exploitative practices that could
fall within the CFPB's "abusive" authority, including credit card
teaser rates 1 5 9 and bank overdraft programs. 1 6 0 Unfortunately, the
CFPB is politically imperiled and is unlikely to expand its reach in
the near future.1 6 1 On the other hand, it is important to recognize
that while the "abusive" standard incorporates behavioral
concepts explicitly, any standard that uses ordinary consumers as
a benchmark can and should take behavior into account. Nothing
precludes courts from finding that practices such as teaser rates are
"unfair" or "deceptive" because they exploit consumers' biases or
limitations, as long as the other elements of those standards are
satisfied as well. For "deceptive," this entails conceiving of
consumers who "act reasonably" yet are nevertheless boundedly
rational; for "unfair," it means finding that certain injuries caused
by exploitative practices are not "reasonably avoidable" for
boundedly rational consumers. In either event, courts are free to
construe reasonableness with due consideration of the average
consumer's level of understanding, critical thinking, or ability to
protect themselves in a given circumstance. The "abusive"
Harvard, supra note 7, at 1852-53.
Id. at 1853.
156 Id. at 1858.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1644; Corrigan, supra note 11,
at 159-69.
160 See Lee, supra note 148, at 126.
161 See Roquemore, supra note 145, at 206-08.
154
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standard is notable for making these considerations explicit, but it
has not conjured them from the air.
C. Protectingthe Least Sophisticated Consumers
Another consumer standard of note arises from judicial
interpretation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
("FDCPA"),162 enacted in 1977 to end "abusive practices in the debt
collection industry."1 63 The reasonableness of collection activities
and communications with debtors under this statute is assessed
"from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer, who
lacks the sophistication of the average consumer and may be naive
about the law, but is rational and possesses a rudimentary amount
of information about the world." 164 In language hearkening back
to pre-Policy Statement FTC jurisprudence, courts have
emphasized that this standard is "designed to protect all
consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd." 165 The Second
Circuit recently held, for example, that debt collectors are required
to notify consumers that their current outstanding balance "may
increase due to interest and fees," to protect consumers "who may
hold the reasonable but mistaken belief that timely payment [of the
amount due at the time of the collection notice] will satisfy their
debts. "166

The judicially created FDCPA standard is interesting for
several reasons. First, it establishes a distinctly more expansive
scope of protection than the FTC and CFPB standards, one that is
not mirrored elsewhere in federal consumer law. Rather than
protecting only attentive consumers, the standard encompasses
those people "whom deceptive debt collection practices are most
likely to dupe."1 67 One might ask why there is a markedly lower
threshold in this area of debtor rights than for other financial
consumers; certainly the least sophisticated consumers are
"especially vulnerable,"1 68 but this is no less true in other areas.
Perhaps an answer is that, not being tethered to the neoclassical
deceptiveness standard established in the Policy Statement, judges
162
163
16

2010).
165
166
167
168

15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1978) et seq..

Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., 516 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2008).
Ellis v. Solomon and Solomon, P.C., 591 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir.
Id. at 135.
Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., 817 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2016).
Sachs, supra note 54, at 504.
Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.3d 1314,1319 (2d Cir. 1993).
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were less path-dependent when deciding on the statute's reach.
Second, courts applying this standard have "been careful
not to conflate lack of sophistication with unreasonableness," 169 an
important distinction that judges elsewhere risk eliding. The
picture of someone whose decision-making reflects "below average
sophistication and intelligence"'7 0 but who is nevertheless
reasonable and even "rational" contrasts sharply with the
neoclassical rational choice ideal. Indeed, in practice the "least
sophisticated consumer" may bear more resemblance to a
realistically bounded and limited "average consumer" than do
some judicial conceptions of the average consumer. Regardless, the
FDCPA standard would not be viable if applied to consumers
universally: making the floor the baseline for protection in all
consumer contexts would offer broad protective scope, but it
would likely lead to an explosion of claims and ultimately
disincentivize not just exploitative practices but welfareenhancing behavior as well.

EU LAW
Like the US, the EU has multiple systems of consumer
protection, both horizontal and vertical. The contours of consumer
protection law in EU Member States themselves are by and large
beyond this paper's scope, which focuses on the "average
consumer" standard first developed by the CJEU and codified in
the UCPD. The standard's function "is typical for the EU
constitutional and institutional context: it is used as a tool to
mediate policy conflicts between EU and Member States' laws ...
[and] to assess whether indirectly discriminatory measures can be
justified on grounds of consumer protection."' 1 Moreover, the
UCPD aims for full harmonisation, where "Member States can no
longer implement or apply either less or more restrictive or
prescriptive consumer protection measures in the area it
harmonises."172 From this, at least in theory, "consumers and
business will be able to rely on a single regulatory framework
based on clearly defined legal concepts regulating all aspects of
El/is, 591 F.3d at 135.
Clomon, 988 F.3d at 1319.
171 Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 5.
172 Luis Gonzalez Vaqu6, Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial
Practices and Its Application to Food-Related Consumer Protection, 10 EUR.
FOOD & FEED L. REV. 210, 214 (2015) (quoting UCPD Guidance 2009).
169
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unfair commercial practices across the EU." 7 3
A. Reasonably Observant and Circumspect: the Average
Consumer
The UCPD is "the instrument with the broadest and most
general application in the field of [EU] consumer law." 174 Its
purpose is to "strike the right balance between the need to protect
consumers and the promotion of free trade in an openly
competitive market."' 7 5 To effectuate this balance, "national
measure[s] prohibiting claims that might deceive only a very
are
deemed
consumer"
naive,
or cursory
credulous,
"disproportionate" because they "create an unjustified barrier to
trade."1 76
The Directive does not exclude only the very credulous
from its protective ambit, however. Rather, it "takes as a
benchmark the average consumer, who is reasonably wellinformed and reasonably observant and circumspect,. taking into
account social, cultural and linguistic factors, as interpreted by the
Court of Justice."'7 7 Thus, under the UCPD, a practice is unfair if
it is either misleading or aggressive and "it materially distorts or is
likely to materially distort the economic behavior with regard to
the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom
it is addressed, or of the average member of the group when a
commercial practice is directed to a particular group of
consumers." 7 8
The "average consumer" standard was first developed in
cases regarding the free movement of goods within the internal
market.1 79 Simply stated, it is the standard that must be applied
"when determining whether a national regulatory measure
constitutes a barrier to trade" within the EU. 8 0 The seminal CJEU
case Gut Springenheide synthesized case law on the topic, stating
emphatically that only "the opinion of the informed average
UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 10.
UCPD Guidance 2016, supra note 39, at 38.
Id.
UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
UCPD Art. 5(2); see Chris Willett, Fairness and Consumer DecisionMaking Under the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 33 J. OF CONS.
POL'Y 247, 248 (2010).
179 See Mak 2012a, supra note 90 at 5-6.
180 Helleringer & Sibony,.supra note 14, at 616.
173
174
175
176
177.
178
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consumer" who is "reasonably attentive" and "capable of noticing
the sometimes subtle differences between different terms" counts
when assessing commercial practices. 8 1 The court contrasted this
creature with "[t]he casual consumer [who] does not pay enough
attention to the fine print on a product but is more likely to be
influenced by the colour [and design] of the pack."1 82
Commentators have observed that the "idealized average
EU consumer" bears little resemblance to most actual
consumers.' 8 3 Professor Mak in particular has noted the strong
normative component to this jurisprudence,1 84 notwithstanding its
supposed depiction of "the notional, typical consumer" as opposed
to an aspirational ideal. 8 5 Yet there is little point to a consumer
protection regime that protects from deception only those
individuals too savvy and attentive to be deceived, particularly if
that regime "provides the ceiling . .. for member states in terms of
protection" as well. 18 6 If the EU truly aims for "a high level of
consumer protection" under the UCPD,1 8 7 then it does not make
sense to place the "average consumer" bar out of most consumers'
realistic reach, even if doing so removes barriers to trade.
Fortunately, the UCPD standard need not be interpreted so
narrowly as to "set[] an overly demanding standard for
consumers" 8 8 or "undermin[e]" well-tailored consumer protection
efforts by member states.1 89 To begin with, national courts are
expressly given leeway to apply "social, cultural and linguistic
factors" when considering "the typical reaction of an average
consumer in a given case."1 90 Through this, "member states might
legitimately conclude that, at least sometimes, the average
consumer in their country is not as well-informed and circumspect
as the ECJ [ideal]."191
C-210/96, Gut Springenheide GmbH v. Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises
Steinfurt - Amt fur Lebensmitteluberwachung [1998] E.C.R. 1-4657; [1999] 1
181

C.M.L.R. 1383

¶¶

96, 100.

Id. at [ 97.
183 Helleringer & Sibony, supra note 14, at 617; see also, e.g., Incardona
and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 22; Willett, supra note 178, at 268-69.
184 See Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 4-8.
185 UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
186 Willett, supra note 178, at 252.
187 UCPD Art. 1.
188 Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 22.
189 Willett, supra note 178, at 269.
190 UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
191 Willett, supra note 178, at 270; see also Mak 2012a, supra note 90,
at 7-8.
182

2019

Bringing Down the Average

33

More generally, however, courts are empowered to
interpret what it means to be "reasonably well-informed and
reasonably observant and circumspect." How observant must a
consumer be to be "reasonably observant"? There is no reason that
a court cannot take into account our bounded rationality and
willpower when making this determination. Particularly in light of
the European Commission's guidance that courts account for
behavioral economics when applying the UCPD, there is ample
room to conceptualize the "reasonable" characteristics of the
average consumer with due consideration of our cognitive biases
and limitations. 19 2 It is to this marriage of the "average consumer"
standard and behavioral concepts that we now turn.
B. Ashbourne, Purely Creative, and Teekanne
The European Commission has emphasized that "national
courts . .. [should] assess the misleading character of commercial
practices by taking into account the most recent findings on
behavioural economics."1 9 3 As Professor Willett notes, "[r]eading
the average consumer concept in this light suggests acceptance that
practices may rather readily impact consumers and influence their
decision-making." 1 9 4 Nevertheless, this non-binding guidance has
had minimal apparent impact, as courts generally have not
incorporated behavioral concepts into "average consumer"
jurisprudence.19 5 There are three important exceptions, examined
below.
1. Ashbourne
In 2011, the UK's High Court of Justice issued a ruling that
grounded the notion of an "average consumer" firmly within the
behavioral sphere. The defendant, Ashbourne Management
Services, contracted with local gym clubs to generate and manage
membership subscriptions. "[E]ach of Ashbourne's standard form
agreements set[] a minimum membership period of 12, 24, or 36
months," and gym members wishing to terminate their agreements
96
early were subject to a heavy fee.1
See Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 29-31.
UCPD Guidance 2016, supra note 39, at 53. The statement also
appeared in the original 2009 guidance document.
194 Willett, supra note 178, at 270.
192
193

See, e.g., Helleringer & Sibony, supra note 14, at 616-17.
The Office of Fair Trading v. Ashbourne Management Services Ltd

&
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Assessing the agreements on unfairness grounds, the court
first considered whether an average consumer would find the
contractual language "plain and intelligible." It answered in the
affirmative, finding that "the average consumer reading each of the
agreements reasonably carefully would have been left in no doubt
that he was signing up for a minimum period."1 9 7 The court
acknowledged that the agreements did not expressly state that the
consequence of early termination was "immediate liability for
payments that would otherwise have been payable over the
balance of the minimum term," but concluded that it would be
"self-evident to the average consumer" that they had no right to
end the membership before the agreed-upon period.1 9 8
Notwithstanding the clarity of the contractual terms, the
court held that the agreements were "designed and calculated to
take advantage of the naivety and inexperience of the average
consumer" and were therefore unfair. 19 9 Specifically, the court
stated that "[t]he average consumer tends to overestimate how
often he will use the gym once he has become a member and
[underestimate] unforeseen circumstances [that] may make
continued use of its facilities impractical or unaffordable."2 00 It
further noted the "notorious fact that many people join such gym
clubs having resolved to exercise regularly but fail to attend at all
after two or three months."2 0 1 The court found that Ashbourne was
"well aware" that the average consumer would be. induced to join
by the low monthly fees, despite the fact that consumers who used
the gym for fewer than six months were better off paying on a per
month basis.2 0 2
In other words, the Ashbourne court held that average
consumers can be fully informed regarding the terms of an
agreement yet still exploited by a commercial counterparty. The
case thus marks a rare judicial acknowledgment that even
circumspect and observant consumers are susceptible to cognitive
biases.

Ors [2011] EWHC 1237 (Ch) (27 May 2011) 1129.
197 Id. at ¶158.
198 Id. at ¶1159-60.
199 Id. at ¶1 73.
200 Id. at ¶164.
201 Id.
202 Id. at ¶171..
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2. Purely Creative
The CJEU similarly relied on behavioral concepts in its
2012 Purely Creative decision. There, promotional materials
accurately informed consumers that they were "entitled to claim
one of a number of specified prizes or awards." 2 03 To find out
which prize she was entitled to, the consumer was given three
options, two of which (telephone and SMS) cost money and one
(ordinary post) did not. "[C]ustomers were encouraged to use a
more expensive route than the postal route," and virtually all
available prizes were worth less money than a consumer "might
already have paid in telephone/text charges" or in delivery and
insurance. 204
The court held that such a promotion was impermissible
under the UCPD, which specifies that any practice in which a
consumer must incur a cost in order to claim a prize is inherently
unfair. 2 0 5 In so holding, the court explained that "the reference to a
prize seeks to exploit the psychological effect created in the mind
of a consumer by the perspective of having won something and to
cause him to take a decision which is not always rational and
which he would not have taken otherwise." 2 0 6
Furthermore, the court concluded that as long as one of the
potential methods for claiming. the prize cost money, it was
irrelevant that the trader also offered other methods that were free
of charge. In a passage sounding straight out of behavioral
economics literature, the court observed that this is because "[i]t is
the very prospect of taking possession of the prize which influences
the consumer and may cause him to take a decision he would not
take otherwise, such as choosing the quickest method offinding out
what prize he has won, even though that may be the most expensive
method."2 0 7
3. Teekanne
Finally, the Teekanne case relaxed the stringent duty-toread that the "average consumer" standard had previously
imposed. The question in that case was whether the packaging of
Purely Creative and Others v. Office of Fair Trading [2012] EUECJ C428/11 (18 Oct. 2012)¶ 14.
204 Id.
205 See UCPD Annex I, at [31.
206 Purely Creative, supra note 203, at T 49.
207 Id. at %50(emphases added).
203
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a fruit tea could mislead an average consumer into believing the
tea contained raspberry or vanilla-flower, despite the fact that the
ingredients list accurately stated that those components were not
present. The court found that "the list of ingredients, even though
correct and comprehensive, may in some situations not be capable
of correcting sufficiently the consumer's erroneous or misleading
impression. . . of a foodstuff that stems from the other items
comprising its labelling." 20 8 Professors Schebesta and Purnhagen
opine that "Teekanne marks a significant realignment" in
consumer jurisprudence to the extent that it "reflect[s] insights
from behavioural sciences to decide on the benchmark of the
average consumer." 2 09 While Teekanne arguably does so less
explicitly than Ashbourne or Purely Creative, certainly Teekanne's
reasoning acknowledges heuristics like anchoring and the
prominence of visual cues in consumer decision-making, which
have heretofore been underaccounted for by judges.
4. An Uncertain Impact
The "average consumer" described by these cases is
imperfectly rational, impulse-driven, and open to influence by
more sophisticated counterparties. If more courts were to heed the
direction of the Commission and take behavioral concepts into
account, such a creature could easily populate judicial decisions in
other contexts as well, such as consumer credit agreements: the
parallels between the Ashbourne decision and teaser rates, for
example, are striking. While this has not happened yet, there are
indications that judges are diverging from the idealized consumer
in a different way, as "both the Court of Justice and national courts
have suggested that the views of the average consumer ... might
need to be derived from empirical evidence rather than discerned
through judicial discretion."2 10 This paper posits that, where this is
not desirable or feasible, judicial discretion can nevertheless be
marshaled in support of a more realistic view of consumer
decision-making.

C:2015:361, Bundesverband eV v Teekanne GmbH & Co. KG,
2016 E.C.R 361 140.
209 Schebesta and Purnhagen, supra note 33, at 593, 596.
210 Davis, supra note 6, at 16; see also Kai Purnhagen, More Reality in
the CJEU's Interpretation of the Average Consumer Benchmark - Also More
Behavioural Science in Unfair Commercial Practices?, 8 EUR. J. RISK. REG.
437, 439 (2017).
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C. Vulnerability
The UCPD distinguishes "between 'average'
and
'particularly vulnerable' consumers in providing protection from
certain unfair commercial practices."2 1 1 To wit, any practices
foreseeably likely to "distort the economic behavior only of a
clearly identifiable group of consumers who are particularly
vulnerable to the practice or the underlying product because of
their mental or physical infirmity, age or credulity . .. shall be
assessed from the perspective of the average member of that
group." 2 12 This has raised questions about the relationship between
vulnerable consumers and consumers who are "not reasonably
informed, observant, and circumspect." 2 1 3 It has also prompted
concerns of stigmatization for consumers labeled as vulnerable. 2 14
Two key insights have emerged about consumer
vulnerability, although they only raise further questions about how
and when the concept is to be applied. First, "vulnerability is best
viewed as a spectrum rather than a binary state." 2 1 5 The European
Commission has identified five dimensions of vulnerability-for
example, a "[h]igher susceptibility to market practices, creating
[atypical] imbalances in market interactions" 2 16-and finds that
"[m]ost consumers show signs of vulnerability in at least one
dimension." 2 1 7

Second, one must distinguish between "endogenous"
vulnerability, arising from enduring personal characteristics, and
situational or transactional vulnerability, which arises from oftentemporary circumstance. 2 18 Thus, "[c]onsumier vulnerability may
be linked to individual characteristics such as age, health and
Waddington, supra note 17, at 759.
UCPD Art. 5(3).3.
213 Incardona and Poncib6, supra note 1, at 28.
214 Waddington, supra note 17, at 778.
215 European Commission, Consumer vulnerability across key markets
in the European Union, Executive Summary, at 2 (January 2016)
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/consumer-_vulnearability-execsumen.pdf [hereinafter EC 2016 Executive Summary].
216 Id. at 3.
217 UCPD Guidance, supra note 39, at 43.
218 European Parliament, Committee on the Internal Market and
Consumer Protection, Report on a Strategy for Strengthening the Rights of
Vulnerable
Consumers
at
6
(May
8,
2012)
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=
A7-2012-0155&Ianguage=EN [hereinafter European Parliament 2012
Report].
211
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education, to personal circumstances such as financial situation or
employment status, or to market factors, such as . .. complexity of
contract terms and conditions." 2 19 Moreover, "[c]onsumers may
move in and out of states of vulnerability and they may be
vulnerable in respect of some categories but not others," 220 such
that "the 'average' consumer can easily be rendered 'vulnerable,'
such as
circumstance,
in]
[changes
on ...
depending
unemployment or illness, and with regard to differing consumer
products." 22 1
Taken together, these facts mean that "all consumers, at
some point in their life, can become vulnerable," 2 2 2 and that most
are already vulnerable sometimes depending on "the situation in
which they are placed or find themselves." 2 2 3 The Commission has
also concluded that "behavioural biases such as risk aversion and
cognitive limitations are relevant to vulnerability." 2 2 4 So what do
we do with this? Vulnerability in the UCPD is necessarily
measured relative to the average consumer, so judges cannot (and
should not) simply treat average consumers as vulnerable. Doing
so is also a disservice to those populations that are genuinely and
intractably more vulnerable than most consumers. Rather, the
answer is that vulnerability should remain a distinct category of
"particular[] susceptib[ility]," 225 but should be gauged against a
more accurate picture of an imperfectly rational "average
consumer." Judges also should be conscious of transactional
vulnerability, particularly in instances of complex financial
products or other indications of a significant sophistication gap
between the parties.
D. Additional Considerations
There, is reason to think that the marginal effect of a toorestrictive reasonableness standard on consumer protection in the
EU is less than in the US, given the EU's more robust consumer
protection regime overall. Professor Mak argues that EU "free
movements" public law, including the UCPD, uses a normative
Consumer Conditions Scoreboard, Consumers at Home in the Single
Market (2017 ed.) at 9 [hereinafter 2017 Scoreboard].
220 EC 2016 Executive Summary, supra note 215, at 2.
221 Waddington, supra note 17, at 780.
222 European Parliament 2012 Report, supra note 219, at 6.
223 Waddington, supra note 17, at 758.
224 EC 2016 Executive Summary, supra note 215, at 4.
225 UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
219
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conception of the average consumer that primarily advances goals
of market integration in part because national law and private law
provide consumers with protection in other ways. 2 2 6
Likewise, "Directives aimed at harmonization of consumer
contract law generally take a very consumer-friendly stance,
imposing a higher level of consumer protection than the free
movements regulation would allow,"2 27 and "the CJEU tends to
take a very pro-consumer stance in cases where it is asked to
interpret [such] Directives." 2 2 8 For instance, case law interpreting
the Unfair Terms Directive, Consumer Sales Directive, Doorstep
Selling Directive, and Distance Selling Directive "is clearly more
favourable to consumers than the 'average consumer' of EU law
would need." 2 2 9 While this results in an inconsistency between the
two levels of consumer protection, 2 3 0 it is true that protective
features such as rights of withdrawal or the ex officio testing of
unfair terms apply to "even the most nonchalant consumer," not
just those who are deemed sufficiently reasonable.2 3 1 By contrast,
the US system has fewer consumer-friendly backstops in other
areas of the law, 2 3 2 and accordingly a more realistic judicial
interpretation of "reasonable consumers" might have greater
impact.

A LESS SOPHISTICATED STANDARD
All consumers are boundedly rational to some degree; it is
how humans are wired. Consumers process information
imperfectly,
seek
to conserve
cognitive
resources
by
oversimplifying their choices, and are easily influenced by the
strategic behavior of more sophisticated counterparties. Many lack
basic financial literacy and are poor at estimating risks and costs.
Most make decisions governed by impulse and have difficulty
weighing their future self-interest against present desires. They
Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 4-9.
Vanessa Mak, Standards of Protection: In Search of the 'Average
Consumer' of EU Law in the Proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive,
TISCO Working Paper Series on Banking, Finance and Services No. 04/2010
(June 2010) at 3, http://ssrn.com/Iink/Tilburg-TISCO-Banking-Financing.htmI
[hereinafter Mak 2010].
228 Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 6.
229 Mak 2010, supra note 227, at 9.
230 See id. at 3; Mak 2012a, supra note 90, at 2.
231 Mak 2010, supra note 227, at 6.
232 Cf. Helleringer & Sibony, supra note 14, at 610-11.
226
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have limited time, limited memory, and a limited attention span,
and their judgment is often compromised by mental and emotional
stresses. In aggregate, these factors lead to systematic and
predictable errors in consumer decision-making that can be
exploited in welfare-reducing ways.
Judges most likely understand all of these things about
people in the abstract, intuitively if not empirically, even if their
jurisprudence does not reflect as much. It is no great secret, for
example, that advertising shapes our preferences, that we often
regret the choices we make, or that people generally do not read
the small print. Nobody truly believes that the average consumer
is a perfectly "rational risk calculator[]."2. 33
The question, then, is this: if it is preferable, all else being
equal, for courts to use a benchmark that acknowledges the flaws
and quirks of real-world consumer behavior rather than hewing to
an idealized abstraction, 234 how may this be accomplished within
the bounds of present-day consumer protection law?
1. Proposal
This paper proposes that judges view the average, ordinary
consumer as, fundamentally, "less sophisticated." That is, for any
judicial task that requires the court "to determine the typical
reaction of the average consumer in a given case" 2 35 or to otherwise
put itself in the shoes of "a consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances," 2 3 6 judges should be mindful that (1) the average
consumer is less sophisticated than the rational choice ideal; (2) the
average consumer likely is less sophisticated than her commercial
counterparty-most obviously in areas of finance and consumer
credit, but also in any transaction where the counterparty has
sufficient resources, experience, or incentive to take advantage of
consumer biases and limitations; and, crucially, (3) the average
consumer is less sophisticated than the judge herself. Judges also
should be attuned to circumstances or characteristics of the target
consumer group in the given case that might render them even less
sophisticated than the average consumer baseline in their
interactions with the market-such as financial pressures, health
problems, or employment status-if only temporarily.
The virtue of this approach is that courts employing it need
233
234
235

236

Ripken, supra note 2, at 935.
See Part III.D, supra.
UCPD Recital 18, supra note 85.
Ebner, 838 F.3d at 965.
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not take behavioral concepts into account explicitly; it is
unnecessary that the judge herself be familiar with the endowment
effect or the anchoring heuristic, for example, although such
familiarity would certainly assist in formulating a view of the
ordinary consumer with greater precision. Rather, judges would
only need to keep in mind that consumers, being human, are prone
to error and suasion and do not always make choices carefully or
process information well, paying special attention to situations
where the sophistication gap is particularly large or the product at
issue particularly complex. This effectively substitutes one judicial
heuristic ("assume that the. average consumer is less sophisticated
than you think") for another ("assume that the average consumer
is highly rational, discerning, and attentive"), ideally reducing
social costs by relaxing a too-restrictive threshold of consumer
protection.
It is important to note that the "less sophisticated" standard
is not so expansive as to encompass the FDCPA's "least
sophisticated consumer," nor does it presume that all consumers
are "particularly vulnerable" under the UDCP. Rather, it fits
within the plausible scope of judicial interpretation of existing
benchmarks in the US and EU. As discussed in Parts IV and V,
nothing in the prevailing standards forecloses an image of the
ordinary consumer that reflects behavioral realities; indeed, the
European Commission has expressly exhorted courts to take such
considerations into account.2 37 Boundedly rational consumers may
still be "reasonably observant and circumspect" or "act reasonably
in the circumstances"-if this were not the case, then nobody
would meet these thresholds, since we are all boundedly rational.
It is likewise possible to be both "reasonably observant" and also
"less sophisticated" than a perfectly rational actor, a counterparty,
or a judge. The key is the word "reasonably" and the judicial
discretion that entails; a court may justifiably conclude that a
reasonably observant consumer is influenced by how information
is presented, or that the preferences of someone who is reasonably
well-informed can nevertheless be manipulated by playing on their
cognitive biases. That is the essence of the "less sophisticated"
standard.
2. Critiques
The primary critique of the "less sophisticated" standard,
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most likely, is that if judges lower the bar of the "average
consumer" to take bounded rationality and willpower, low
financial literacy, asymmetric sophistication, and limits on
informational processing power into account, it will be difficult to
navigate the line between the impermissible exploitation of
cognitive biases and the savvy business practices of a competitive
market participant. Numerous commentators have catalogued the
many commonplace ways in which lenders and retailers habitually
take advantage of constraints on consumers' rationality and
23 8 In a
decision-making capabilities to increase their bottom line.
real sense, capitalism requires sellers seeking to maximize their
profits in a competitive market to exploit the cognitive biases and
limitations of consumers as much as possible without veering into
outright force or fraud. 23 9
In Ashbourne, for instance, the target consumers were
anyone "interested in using a gym club which is not a high end
facility and who may be attracted by the relatively low monthly
subscriptions." 240 No representation was made that this group was
especially vulnerable or below average in their susceptibility to
minimum term tactics. Rather, they were average consumers who
in this respect were less sophisticated and thus capable of being
exploited. But, what sets the Ashbourne consumers apart from any
cohort that is induced to purchase products that they will not use
as much as they initially expect, whether the product is a blender
or a magazine subscription or a timeshare in the Caribbean, or
products where the future cost may be greater than anticipated,
such as residential mortgages or teaser-rate credit cards?
The answer must be that this requires case-by-case
determination. There is no consumer protection standard in which
the exploitation of consumer biases, standing alone, is sufficient to
justify restricting a commercial practice. Even the CFPB's
"abusive" authority, which expressly reaches practices that exploit
limited consumer understanding and cognition, only applies to acts
that "take[] unreasonable advantage of" those limitations; it is then
up to judges to determine what is an "unreasonable advantage" in
a given instance. Likewise, the Ashbourne court's holding was not
simply predicated on a finding that the gym memberships in
question took advantage of consumers' underestimations of their
238 See Willis, supra note 5, at 781-84; Van Loo, supra note 23, at 132728; Bubb & Pildes, supra note 3, at 1638-48.
239 See Bar-Gill 2008, supra note 19, at 765.
240 Ashbourne at ¶ 155.

2019

Bringing Down the Average

43

future gym use, but that doing so created a "significant
imbalance ... to the detriment of the consumer in a manner ...
that is contrary to good faith." 2 4 1 In short, some line-drawing is
unavoidable, but judges must draw lines under the prevailing
standards as well: it is, almost literally, the raison d'etre of the
occupation. And, the alternative to taking bounded rationality into
account when considering consumer reasonableness is not taking
it into account at all-in which case the judicial standard is
untethered from reality and will almost certainly under-deter
broad swathes of commercial behavior that ordinary, average
consumers find misleading, deceptive, or otherwise destructive of
their social welfare.
Another critique of the proposed standard is that
consumers whose bounded rationality is acknowledged by the
courts will have less incentive to learn and become less imperfectly
rational over time. 2 4 2 As discussed earlier, however, it is
questionable how much an idealized judicial standard of consumer
behavior genuinely prompts consumers to learn to correct their
own cognitive errors and biases. First, "[bjecause much of
shopping happens in 'autopilot mode,' consumers' focus is
diverted, which hinders detection of errors and ultimately.prevents
the. . . consumer learning process."2 43 Furthermore, unlike the tort
context, in which arguably "the risk of legal liability creates
incentives for individuals to overcome their cognitive biases in
order to conform" to a normative standard of reasonableness, 2 4 4 the
incentives for consumers are diffused. If anything, it is a lax risk of
liability that incentivizes commercial counterparties to push the
envelope in exploiting consumer biases under an idealized
standard. To the extent that a more realistic standard eases this
countervailing pressure by making sellers more wary about taking
advantage of the sophistication gap, consumers are benefited. And,
again, the alternative is hewing to a standard that does not reflect
reality and crossing our fingers that it will prompt consumers to
overcome millennia of cognitive wiring and strategic behavior by
profit-maximizing firms.
A final critique is that the proposed standard reduces legal
certainty by giving judges leave to invalidate a broader range of
commercial practices on the basis of consumer biases and
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limitations. There is an inevitable trade-off to all discretionary
standards; they are situation-specific by nature.2 4 5 A rule that
presumed that reasonable consumers could never be deceived, for
example, would maximize legal certainty-no commercial practice
would ever be deemed deceptive-at the expense of consumer
protection; likewise, a rule that consumers are always deceived by
exploitative practices would maximize certainty at the expense of
commerce. The outcome of a standard that seeks to balance
24 6
on
market freedom with "a high level of consumer protection,"
of
a
circumstances
on
the
dependent
the other hand, is necessarily
simply
must
Judges
given case and therefore necessarily uncertain.
strive to ensure that the benefits of how the standard is applied
outweigh the attendant costs; this paper argues that a realistic
vision of consumer behavior has greater net benefit than an
inaccurate one.
CONCLUSION
The prevailing judicial image of the typical consumer in the
US and EU lags behind our modern-day understanding of how
consumers actually think and behave. To the extent that courts
apply a standard that treats the "average" or "reasonable"
consumer as more attentive, more discerning, more rational, more
financially literate, and generally more sophisticated than he or she
really is, consumer protection law will under-deter welfarereducing behavior by commercial counterparties and perpetuate
existing imbalances of power, especially in areas of consumer
finance and credit. Judges can and should use their discretion
under, the existing legal standards to propound a more realistic
view of consumer behavior, recognizing that even the average
consumer has cognitive biases and limitations that should be taken
into account whenever the fairness of commercial practices is
considered.
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